A tv show on Bravo, Untying the Knot, as reported by Art Hinshaw on ADR Prof Blog:
"Obviously having the mediator “determine a fair division of assets” doesn’t sound like mediation; Ms. Ziegler is engaging in early neutral evaluation (ENE). But ENE has gone the way of Betamax and is so confused with mediation that it’s not worth the time to fight it. In fact, I’ve seen and heard of many well respected mediators engage in such behavior. So, let’s hope that this practice does not become what the public expects from divorce mediation, as this clearly limits the good that mediation can do in divorce. Nevertheless, clips of the show are going to be great for class this fall when we discuss facilitative and evaluative mediation styles."
Negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and other processes of dispute resolution.
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Saturday, July 12, 2014
Thursday, July 3, 2014
Candor in Negotiation, Mediation, and Arbitration
Michael Dallaire's article begins: "Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is here to stay. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) must acknowledge that fact. Several scholars have posited the lofty goal of creating an entirely separate code of ethics for ADR or at least individual processes. But the process of ADR-specific rules must begin within the framework of the existing Model Rules. One of the first steps in that direction should be to clearly define the level of candor required of an attorney-advocate in each major ADR forum. An attorney’s duty to tell the truth, or his ability to deceive, should not be governed by a static standard when operating across a range of informal, nonbinding, participant-controlled settings like unassisted negotiation and mediation. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct should include separate and distinct duties of candor for each major ADR forum, formulating each based on the unique characteristics of an individual forum. The reformulated rules should focus on two primary factors in setting the requisite level of candor for a particular forum: (1) the stage in the dispute resolution process in which the particular forum is normally used, and (2) the degree to which a third-party neutral affects settlement."
Saturday, June 28, 2014
Negotiation by Consumers: Haggling for a Better Price
Techniques from the Harvard Law School Program on Negotiation
Thursday, June 26, 2014
Informed Consent in Mediation
McGeorge Law Professor Michael Colatrella has an interesting article entitled Informed Consent in Mediation: Promoting Pro Se Parties’ Informed Settlement Choice While Honoring the Mediator's Ethical Duties.
His abstract:
This article explores the question of how mediators can promote informed settlement choices by pro se litigants while still abiding by a mediator’s ethical duties of impartiality and party self-determination. “Informed consent” is the legal term that describes the circumstances under which a person knowingly and voluntarily agrees to a course of action recommended by a professional, like a physician or lawyer. The mediation scholarship distinguishes between two kinds of informed consent: “participation” consent and “outcome” consent. A party’s decision to take part in mediation is participation consent. “Outcome consent” addresses the degree to which a party understands the consequences of the settlement agreement reached during the mediation process. Mediator ethical codes provide minimal guidance on the issue, leaving unacceptable ambiguity as to the role the mediator plays in a participant’s informed participation and outcome consent. Moreover, some mediation scholars imprudently argue that when a pro se participant is ordered by the court to attend mediation, the mediator must obtain informed outcome consent — even if this means acting impartiality, as that duty is presently defined. This article concludes that the law should impose a duty on mediators of informed participation consent, but not informed outcome consent. Requiring informed participation consent is consistent with the mediator’s established role of educating parties about the mediation process and empowering them to fully and knowingly engage in that process. Imposing the duty of informed outcome consent on the mediator, however, would create a significant conflict with the mediator’s ethical obligation of impartiality and undermine the efficacy of mediation.
His abstract:
This article explores the question of how mediators can promote informed settlement choices by pro se litigants while still abiding by a mediator’s ethical duties of impartiality and party self-determination. “Informed consent” is the legal term that describes the circumstances under which a person knowingly and voluntarily agrees to a course of action recommended by a professional, like a physician or lawyer. The mediation scholarship distinguishes between two kinds of informed consent: “participation” consent and “outcome” consent. A party’s decision to take part in mediation is participation consent. “Outcome consent” addresses the degree to which a party understands the consequences of the settlement agreement reached during the mediation process. Mediator ethical codes provide minimal guidance on the issue, leaving unacceptable ambiguity as to the role the mediator plays in a participant’s informed participation and outcome consent. Moreover, some mediation scholars imprudently argue that when a pro se participant is ordered by the court to attend mediation, the mediator must obtain informed outcome consent — even if this means acting impartiality, as that duty is presently defined. This article concludes that the law should impose a duty on mediators of informed participation consent, but not informed outcome consent. Requiring informed participation consent is consistent with the mediator’s established role of educating parties about the mediation process and empowering them to fully and knowingly engage in that process. Imposing the duty of informed outcome consent on the mediator, however, would create a significant conflict with the mediator’s ethical obligation of impartiality and undermine the efficacy of mediation.
Tuesday, June 17, 2014
Zero-sum Negotiation vs. "Value Can be Created"
Victorian Pynchon well states fundamental points when she writes "The key is not technique but general negotiation principles (such as, ‘value can be created,’ or ‘it is important to understand how parties’ interests interrelate’)....The first step to a successful mutual-benefit negotiation style is to stop thinking about give and take as a zero-sum game. "
Sunday, June 15, 2014
Private Information in Settlement Bargaining Models
Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement Bargaining Models, by Vanderbilt Professors Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum.
The abstract:
"We discuss the implications of various models of settlement negotiations for the revelation or suppression of private information held by the parties. This information may be relevant to multiple audiences, including those involved in the instant lawsuit; other potential litigants that may subsequently make use of the information in their own suits against one of the parties; and more distant observers and users of the legal process. We also examine how rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure can sometimes result in different degrees of purposeful or (arguably) unintended information suppression."
The abstract:
"We discuss the implications of various models of settlement negotiations for the revelation or suppression of private information held by the parties. This information may be relevant to multiple audiences, including those involved in the instant lawsuit; other potential litigants that may subsequently make use of the information in their own suits against one of the parties; and more distant observers and users of the legal process. We also examine how rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure can sometimes result in different degrees of purposeful or (arguably) unintended information suppression."
Wednesday, June 4, 2014
Tuesday, June 3, 2014
Formation of Settlement Agreement
The Texas Supreme Court decided an interesting case about a settlement agreement being formed even though the offeror may not have wanted that. As Jeremy Telman explains:
Amedisys threatened that it would not settle below six figures. Kingwood responded with a settlement offer of $90,000, expecting that Amedisys would reject the offer and trigger Rule 167 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which would allow Kingwood to recover litigation costs if the case went to trial and resulted in a judgment considerably less favorable to Amedisys than the settlement offer.
Amedisys accepted the settlement offer. This apparently was not what Kingwood wanted or expected, and Kingwood refused to treat Amedisys's response as an acceptance.
Tuesday, May 27, 2014
Contempt Sanctions due to Settlement Conference
"Settlement conference" means different things in different places but the usual meaning is something like mediation conducted by the judge presiding over the case. Following judges' orders related to settlement conferences, like following other court orders, is obviously important. Here is an example of contempt sanctions imposed on a party that failed to comply.
As Mary Novak at Just Court ADR explains: Judge Janet Berry did not believe the insurers had complied in good faith with her rules on authority to settle, she found the company in contempt and sanctioned them $50,000.
As Mary Novak at Just Court ADR explains: Judge Janet Berry did not believe the insurers had complied in good faith with her rules on authority to settle, she found the company in contempt and sanctioned them $50,000.
Tuesday, May 20, 2014
Lawyers as (Good and Bad) Deal Killers
Karrass at Negotiation Space writes:
Lawyers are great deal killers. If you tried to bargain away every danger the lawyers foresaw, the negotiation would never end. ...
Lawyers, nevertheless, had an important function in reviewing the final contract. They found areas in which our company vulnerability was too high for comfort. They left us to decide whether we could live with the potential danger or if we needed greater protection. Our decision was made on the basis of the other side’s track record as a reliable seller and their willingness to relieve our vulnerability by granting necessary warranties.
The trouble with these deal-killers is that they are far removed from the real marketplace, while the salesperson is on the front line with buyers every day.
Monday, May 19, 2014
Mediation in New Zealand
Victoria University Law Professor Grant Hamilton Morris
writes that "the modern mediation movement is primarily a result of state-led reform in a variety of legal areas. Much of this reform has been influenced by overseas models emphasising New Zealand’s role as a 'fast-follower' of alternative dispute resolution trends rather than an initiator. The rise of mediation in New Zealand has been ad hoc and pragmatic with a distinct lack of systematic development. This pragmatic change was a response to pressures such as the cost and delay involved in litigation, and major social trends challenging traditional ways, including traditional approaches to resolving disputes. Mediation continues to play a vital role in the New Zealand legal system but the exponential growth of the 1980s and 1990s has slowed as mediation begins to clearly locate and confirm its 'territory' in the New Zealand legal system."
Labels:
court-connected ADR,
mediation,
new zealand
Location:
Lawrence, KS 66049, USA
Sunday, May 18, 2014
Court Connected ADR in Illinois and Maryland
Summarized and linked by Jennifer Shack
Labels:
court-connected ADR,
Illinois,
Maryland
Location:
Lawrence, KS 66049, USA
Wednesday, May 14, 2014
Great Resource for ADR Teachers
Syllabi of dispute resolution courses, maintained by Missouri Law Professor John Lande.
Labels:
John Lande,
syllabi
Location:
Lawrence, KS 66049, USA
Tuesday, April 22, 2014
Good Tips for Negotiators, Especially Lawyers
When leading negotiation scholars are concise, they come up with nuggets of wisdom. These are in the form of recipes for cooking up a deal and I particularly like:
Add in a small amount of doubt with each new proposal by the other party;
balance it with 1 part research and 1 part creative counter-offer.” Chris Honeyman
· Understand what would and could not be a mutually acceptable agreement
· Get to know and understand the other party
· Frame an opening statement
· Ask the other to reciprocate and listen to them carefully
· Ask each other lots of questions to assure understanding
· Work toward a common understanding
· Treat the other with respect and dignity
“Having those who matter present”. Sanda Kaufman
“Knowledge of your counterpart, available remedies, relevant
law and facts”. Nancy Welsh
“the heat is ultimately helpful, and you’re not the only one
feeling it.” Noam Ebner
“Add knowledge in increments (from listening to your
counterparty and also doing
your own background research) till the remaining ignorance
tastes acceptable.Add in a small amount of doubt with each new proposal by the other party;
balance it with 1 part research and 1 part creative counter-offer.” Chris Honeyman
and Roy Lewicki’s entire entry:
· Figure out what you want· Understand what would and could not be a mutually acceptable agreement
· Get to know and understand the other party
· Frame an opening statement
· Ask the other to reciprocate and listen to them carefully
· Ask each other lots of questions to assure understanding
· Work toward a common understanding
· Treat the other with respect and dignity
Thursday, April 3, 2014
Getting to Yes Sooner, Cheaper, and Better
Getting to Yes Sooner, Cheaper, and Better
is the title of an article by Missouri Law Professor John Lande, who interviewed well respected litigators about how they prepare for trial and for negotiation.
"They recommend taking charge of their cases from the outset,
which includes getting a clear understanding of clients and their interests,
developing good relationships with counterpart lawyers, carefully investigating
the cases, making strategic decisions about timing, and enlisting mediators and
courts when needed. The lawyers overwhelmingly suggested starting negotiation
at the earliest appropriate time. Reaching agreement sooner generally produces
the benefit of reduced litigation costs as well as reduced time that parties
invest in litigation. Lawyers produce better agreements when they focus on both
sides’ interests because this enables them to create value, even in supposedly
zero-sum negotiations."
I like the vocabulary Professor John Lande uses: focus on both sides' interests, create value, zero-sum. It really captures well what matters in negotiation.
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