Handshaking Promotes Cooperative Dealmaking, according to a paper, by University of Chicago and Harvard business school professors. The abstract:
Humans use subtle sources of information — like nonverbal behavior — to determine whether to act cooperatively or antagonistically when they negotiate. Handshakes are particularly consequential nonverbal gestures in negotiations because people feel comfortable initiating negotiations with them and believe they signal cooperation (Study 1). We show that handshakes increase cooperative behaviors, affecting outcomes for integrative and distributive negotiations. In two studies with MBA students, pairs who shook hands before integrative negotiations obtained higher joint outcomes (Studies 2a and 2b). Pairs randomly assigned to shake hands were more likely to openly reveal their preferences on trade-off issues, which improved joint outcomes (Study 3). In a fourth study using a distributive negotiation, pairs of executives assigned to shake hands were less likely to lie about their preferences and crafted agreements that split the bargaining zone more equally. Together, these studies show that handshaking promotes the adoption of cooperative strategies and influences negotiation outcomes.
Negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and other processes of dispute resolution.
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Showing posts with label private information. Show all posts
Showing posts with label private information. Show all posts
Monday, August 25, 2014
Handshaking Promotes Cooperative Dealmaking
Sunday, June 15, 2014
Private Information in Settlement Bargaining Models
Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement Bargaining Models, by Vanderbilt Professors Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum.
The abstract:
"We discuss the implications of various models of settlement negotiations for the revelation or suppression of private information held by the parties. This information may be relevant to multiple audiences, including those involved in the instant lawsuit; other potential litigants that may subsequently make use of the information in their own suits against one of the parties; and more distant observers and users of the legal process. We also examine how rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure can sometimes result in different degrees of purposeful or (arguably) unintended information suppression."
The abstract:
"We discuss the implications of various models of settlement negotiations for the revelation or suppression of private information held by the parties. This information may be relevant to multiple audiences, including those involved in the instant lawsuit; other potential litigants that may subsequently make use of the information in their own suits against one of the parties; and more distant observers and users of the legal process. We also examine how rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure can sometimes result in different degrees of purposeful or (arguably) unintended information suppression."
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